ന്യൂദല്‍ഹി: വിവിപാറ്റ് വോട്ടിംഗ് മെഷീനില്‍ ഉള്‍പ്പെടുത്തിയത് തിരിമറി എളുപ്പമാക്കിയെന്ന് മുന്‍ ഐ.എ.എസ് ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥന്‍ കണ്ണന്‍ ഗോപിനാഥന്‍. ട്വിറ്ററിലായിരുന്നു അദ്ദേഹത്തിന്റെ പ്രതികരണം.
വാര്‍ത്തകള്‍ ടെലഗ്രാമില്‍ ലഭിക്കാന്‍ ഇവിടെ ക്ലിക്ക് ചെയ്യൂ
‘നേരത്തെ ബാലറ്റ് യൂണിറ്റ് കണ്‍ട്രോള്‍ യൂണിറ്റുമായി നേരിട്ടാണ് ബന്ധിപ്പിച്ചിരുന്നത്. പക്ഷെ അവയിപ്പോള്‍ വിവിപാറ്റിലൂടെയാണ് കണക്ട് ചെയ്യുന്നത്. അതിനര്‍ത്ഥം നിങ്ങള്‍ ബാലറ്റ് യൂണിറ്റില്‍ അമര്‍ത്തുന്ന വോട്ട് നേരിട്ട് അല്ല കണ്‍ട്രോള്‍ യൂണിറ്റില്‍ രജിസ്റ്റര്‍ ചെയ്യപ്പെടുന്നത് എന്നാണ്. വിവിപാറ്റാണ് കണ്‍ട്രോള്‍ യൂണിറ്റുമായി ആശയവിനിമയം നടത്തുന്നത്.’
So, you might remember my spirited defense of EVMs. I still stand by it, except that my first election with VVPAT has taken away my trust. VVPAT has created a hole in the EVM armor & made the process amenable to hacking @DrSYQuraishi @AshokLavasa @ECISVEEP https://t.co/uKdu7AfBee
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
ഒരു മെമ്മറിയും പ്രിന്റര്‍ യൂണിറ്റും മാത്രമുള്ള ലളിതമായ പ്രൊസസറാണ് വിവിപാറ്റ്. പ്രൊസസറും പ്രോഗ്രാം ചെയ്യാവുന്ന മെമ്മറിയുമുള്ള എന്തും ഹാക്ക് ചെയ്യാനാകുമെന്ന് കണ്ണന്‍ ഗോപിനാഥന്‍ പറയുന്നു. ഏതെങ്കിലും മാല്‍വെയര്‍ വിവിപാറ്റില്‍ ഡൗണ്‍ലോഡ് ചെയ്താല്‍ ആ സിസ്റ്റം മുഴുവന്‍ തകിടം മറിയും. ഇത്തരം ഡിസൈനില്‍ വിവിപാറ്റിലൂടെ വോട്ടിങ്ങ് പ്രക്രിയയില്‍ ആകെ തിരിമറി നടത്താനാകുമെന്നും അദ്ദേഹം കൂട്ടിച്ചേര്‍ത്തു.
ഡൂൾന്യൂസ് യൂട്യൂബ് ചാനൽ സബ്സ്ക്രൈബ് ചെയ്യാനായി ഇവിടെ ക്ലിക്ക് ചെയ്യൂ
Just to state the source, all my references and pics are from the ECI manual on EVMs and VVPAT available for download from the ECI site. https://t.co/G8LCFTSkiy In case of any doubt one may download it and go through in detail. 2/n
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
ദാദ്ര ആന്‍ഡ് നഗര്‍ഹവേലി കളക്ടറായിരുന്ന കണ്ണന്‍ ഗോപിനാഥന്‍ ഈയിടെയാണ് സര്‍വീസില്‍ നിന്ന് രാജിവെച്ചത്. അതേസമയം ഇലക്ട്രോണിക് വോട്ടിംഗ് മെഷീന്‍ പൂര്‍ണമായും സുരക്ഷിതമാണെന്നും തിരിമറി നടത്താനാകില്ലെന്നുമാണ് തെരഞ്ഞെടുപ്പ് കമ്മീഷന്റെ അവകാശവാദം.
On why now & why not while being in the service?
I did raise it on two occasions. During the ECI training of Returning Officers at the IIIDEM, and later at the time of commissioning with ECIL.
So now without attributing any malafide, I would like to put my concerns out. 3/n
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
Unlike before, the Ballot Unit (BU) is not connected to Control Unit (CU – Memory of EVM) directly any more.
It is connected through VVPAT.
Means what you press on that blue button in the BU is not registering the vote in the CU anymore.
But what VVPAT communicates to CU is! pic.twitter.com/08vLFE6rNB
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
That is dangerous!
For VVPAT now controls two things.
1. What is being shown to the public in the form of paper slips. Or the perception & trust factor.
2. What is actually getting registered in the Control Unit as a vote. Or the actual vote factor. 4/n pic.twitter.com/U2dIn8HLH2
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
This itself is a serious design flaw.
But I guess this was done to make use of the existing CUs and BUs.
Existing EVMs did not provide for VVPAT ports.
So VVPAT was so designed to mimic as a CU for the BU and as a BU for the CU. I think. pic.twitter.com/Lki4PRtUMg
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
This itself is a serious design flaw.
But I guess this was done to make use of the existing CUs and BUs.
Existing EVMs did not provide for VVPAT ports.
So VVPAT was so designed to mimic as a CU for the BU and as a BU for the CU. I think. pic.twitter.com/Lki4PRtUMg
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
With the kind of design, it is clear that the whole process can be vitiated by manipulating the VVPAT.
Question now is whether VVPAT can be manipulated?
If it can be, then how & when in the process.
And if it is, then do we have a fool proof process check.
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
As I understand, VVPAT is a simple processor, a memory and a printer unit.
It has a memory because serial numbers, names & symbols of the candidates need to be loaded on to it before the elections, so that it gets printed in the paper slip.
Note: This pic from internet. pic.twitter.com/QGONeIaqDO
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
So VVPAT has a processor, and has a programmable memory, and it is what registers vote in the control unit.
And if it has a processor and a programmable memory, it can be hacked. Any malware downloaded on to it can cause the entire system to misbehave
But now on to when & how?
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
The strongest defense any election officer has had to the question of
‘What if the CU is already programmed/hacked before it comes to you’
was that
‘But they wouldn’t know the sequence of candidates. So whatever they may program, they wouldn’t know who is at what number!’
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
And that fool-proof check is what we have compromised with the introduction of VVPAT.
For symbols are loaded on to the VVPAT by the engineers from their Laptops/Jigs after the candidates are finalized.
VVPATs are connected to external devices after candidate sequence is known!! pic.twitter.com/zkOAvd2nkN
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
When one can access the VVPAT after the candidate sequence is known, and can connect a laptop/computer/Symbol Loading Jig, is precisely when one can load a malware also into the VVPAT.
This access should not have been provided.
That answers the when question. Now to the how. pic.twitter.com/T9JKK4uDpF
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
I forgot to add the other defense we had. That no-one had physical access to the EVMs once candidates are set.
By allowing external devices to be brought to the commissioning room, and allowing it to be connected to VVPAT, we have foregone this defense too.
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
On to the how part: Since VVPAT controls both the trust factor & the vote factor, a possible method could be,
VVPAT prints what is pressed in the BU. So voter sees that paper trail tallies with his pressing of the button. #TheTrust
Sends something else to the CU. #TheVote
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
While we have a provision for if a voter complaints that the VVPAT paper trail does not match with the button he pressed, there is no way he can know if the VVPAT has send the same input to the CU.
So the wrong printing can be caught, but not right printing and wrong registering pic.twitter.com/56D4WuteR6
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
For me, that answers the question of how.
Now on to the question of do we have a fool-proof process check against this.
Ideally, since such a new device has been inserted in between two devices, the verification and tallying should be done at both the ends for every vote.
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
While citizen has verified the BU & VVPAT end, that what he saw is what he pressed, the CU & VVPAT verification needs to be done through tallying paper trails with vote count in the CU.
But as it takes time, we only do such verification for a selected few per constituency.
— Kannan Gopinathan (@naukarshah) September 24, 2019
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